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"GUN FOR HIRE" ADVERTISEMENT THAT BACKFIRED
AND HIT THE PUBLISHER IN THE
POCKETBOOK
In the world of make-believe, "The Equalizer"' advertises his gun
for hire in a New York newspaper. All jobs are completed with a happy
ending. Recently, Soldier of Fortune Magazine was sharply reminded
that real life "gun for hire" scenarios rarely have the same Hollywood-
made endings.2
In Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine,3 ("Norwood") the dis-
trict court of Arkansas held that Soldier of Fortune Magazine ("Maga-
zine") did not have an absolute First Amendment privilege to print "gun
for hire" advertisements in its magazine.4 The Magazine could therefore
be held liable for any adverse consequences flowing from the advertise-
ments.5 By issuing such a ruling, the court was, in effect, cautioning the
media to exercise the right to free speech responsibly, further reminding
them that the right to free speech does not automatically carry a pre-
ferred status over other individual rights.
In Norwood, plaintiff Norman Douglas Norwood sought damages
against defendant Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., and several individ-
ual defendants, for physical injuries allegedly suffered by him as a result
of attempts by some of the individual defendants to injure or murder
him.6 Norwood's nightmare occurred at a time when he thought he had
no reason to worry. He was in the midst of completing a law degree and
1. The Equalizer is a prime-time television action-drama aired by CBS. The main charac-
ter is a former secret government agent who offers, albeit with good intentions, his gun for hire
by placing an ad in the local paper.
2. After the district court denied Soldier of Fortune Magazine's request for summary
judgment, the magazine quickly settled out of court. The exact settlement agreement remains
undisclosed. However, Norwood requested four million dollars in damages. Kennedy, Bum-
bling Gang of Killers Left Trail of Death, Terror, L.A. Times, Sept. 6, 1987, Part I, at 35, col. 3.
Similarly, in a proceeding brought in Houston, Texas, Soldier of Fortune Magazine was
ordered by a jury to pay $9.4 million for publishing a like advertisement. The case brought in
Texas involved Sandra Black, who was shot to death in her home by John W. Hearn, the
individual who placed the advertisement in Soldier of Fortune Magazine. Robert Black, Mrs.
Black's husband, paid John Hearn $10,000 to murder his wife. Belkin, Magazine Is Ordered to
Pay $9.4 Million for Killer's Ad, N.Y. Times, March 4, 1988, Part I, at 9, col. 1.
3. 651 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Ark. 1987).
4. Id. at 1399-1400.
5. Id. at 1402.
6. Id. Norwood alleged that defendant Larry Gray responded to separate advertisements
placed by defendants Savage and Jackson. Gray conspired with each, on different occasions,
to injure or murder Norwood. Id.
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beginning a promising relationship with Cathy Gray. Unfortunately,
Larry Gray wanted Norwood injured, if not murdered, for dating his
estranged wife.7
Gray allegedly found a means to carry out his intent. He contacted
defendants Michael Wayne Jackson ("Jackson") and Richard Savage
("Savage"),' two former law enforcement agents, after reading the sepa-
rate "gun for hire" advertisements they placed in Soldier of Fortune Mag-
azine.9 The publication of the advertisements allegedly provided the
causal nexus for Larry Gray to conspire with Savage and Jackson to have
Norwood murdered. Jackson and Savage succeeded in physically injur-
ing Norwood. Norwood contended that the Magazine, as well as the
individual defendants, should be held liable in damages for the physical
injuries he incurred as a result of the conspiracy.' °
The Magazine moved for summary judgment in the district court on
two grounds. First, the Magazine argued that the language of the adver-
tisements was absolutely privileged under the protections of the First
Amendment. Specifically, it argued that the "gun for hire" advertise-
ments were within the ambit of speech protected by the First Amend-
ment." In support of its position, the Magazine cited New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan 2 ("Sullivan") and Rosenblatt v. Baer 3 as controlling au-
7. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 34, col. 1.
8. Savage pursued several legitimate business ventures which failed before placing his
advertisement in the Magazine. He was also a policeman in Oklahoma for six weeks. Like-
wise, Jackson was in law enforcement for a short stint. He was a Texas police chief for only
three weeks. He had problems with refraining from using his gun and with disrupting city
counsel meetings. Id. at 34, col. 2.
9. Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, 651 F. Supp. 1397, 1398 (W.D. Ark. 1987).
In 1985, Soldier of Fortune Magazine ran two "gun for hire" advertisements. The advertise-
ment for defendant Savage read as follows: "GUN FOR HIRE: 37 year-old-professional mer-
cenary desires jobs. Vietnam Veteran. Discreet and very private. Bodyguard, courier, and
other special skills. All jobs considered. Phone (615) 891-3306 (1-03)." Id.
Similarly, the advertisement for Jackson read: "GUN FOR HIRE. NAM sniper instruc-
tor. SWAT. Pistol, rifle, security specialist, body guard, courier plus. All jobs considered.
Privacy guaranteed. Mike (214) 756-5941(101)." Id.
On the strength of these seemingly inconspicuous, innocuous, and yet candid advertise-
ments, Jackson and Savage were able to attract a considerable amount of business. Norwood
alleged that defendant Gray saw one advertisement and called. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1,
col. 6.
10. Norwood, 651 F. Supp. at 1397.
11. The relevant portion of the First Amendment reads as follows: "Congress shall make
no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievance." U.S. CONST., amend.
I.
12. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). This suit involved libel against a public figure. The Court held
that a public official who believes that he has been libeled by newspaper articles about his job
cannot sue the newspaper unless he proves "actual malice." "Actual malice" exists when the
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thority.14 Second, the Magazine contended that Norwood could not re-
cover because it was not foreseeable that his alleged physical injuries
would result from the advertisements.
The district court disagreed with both contentions and denied the
Magazine's motion. The court concluded that the Magazine did not
have absolute First Amendment protection against Norwood's suit. Fur-
ther, the court held that genuine issues of material fact existed as to
whether plaintiff's alleged injuries were foreseeable consequences of the
"gun for hire" advertisements.15
The district court began its analysis by stating that the Magazine
incorrectly identified the dispositive issue.' 6 The court reasoned that
since Norwood was simply seeking damages for the consequences of the
advertisements, not an injunction, the Magazine was inappropriately ar-
guing that a decision against it would constitute an unlawful regulation
of its right to freedom of the press. 7 Despite this finding, the court dis-
cussed the First Amendment issue in order to justify its position that the
issue raised by the Magazine was not dispositive.
In addressing the First Amendment argument, the court stated that
the Magazine was trying to extend the Sullivan holding far beyond its
intended result by suggesting that it provided defendant's "gun for hire"
advertisements with an absolute privilege under the First Amendment. 18
The Norwood court believed that the United States Supreme Court in
statement is made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not. Id. at 279.
13. 383 U.S. 75 (1966). The Court applied the Sullivan principle to the facts of the case.
Id. at 77. In Rosenblatt, a former county recreation area supervisor brought a libel suit against
a columnist, who stated in his article that the recreation area was doing one hundred percent
better than it had in the years under plaintiff's supervision. The column made no express
reference to plaintiff. The Court held that a plaintiff, who is a public official, must prove actual
malice to recover damages.
14. Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, 651 F. Supp. 1397, 1398 (W.D. Ark. 1987).
15. Id. at 1402-03. According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court is not to
grant a Rule 56 summary judgment motion unless there are "no genuine issue[s] as to any
material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R.
Civ. P. 56. Here, the court found that "reasonable jurors could find ... that plaintiff was
entitled to a verdict." Norwood, 651 F. Supp. at 1402-03.
16. See Norwood, 651 F. Supp. at 1400. The dispositive issue identified by the court was
whether the Magazine could be held liable for damages if a jury believed, after a trial of the
case, that the exercise of defendant's right of publication infringed the equally important per-
sonal integrity rights of the plaintiff. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1398. In support of its position, defendant contended that "the First Amend-
ment carries with it the right to be shielded from civil suits for damages which just as surely
would suppress or hinder the First Amendment rights .... " Id. However, the Magazine's
absolutist position has never been accepted by the Supreme Court. See NIMMER ON FREEDOM
OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 2-3 (1984).
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Sullivan "did not rule that newspapers that criticize public officials can
never be sued and are never responsible for their actions."' 9 Second, the
court suggested that the Sullivan case was factually distinguishable, since
that case involved a libel action brought by a public official against critics
of his official conduct. This case, on the contrary, was a privacy suit
involving commercial speech and the infringement of personal rights.
The Norwood court further reasoned that the Supreme Court has, in
other decisions,2" permitted regulation of commercial speech to a degree
not tolerated with respect to non-commercial speech.2' The court ac-
cepted the historical development of the different treatment of commer-
cial and non-commercial speech and stated that the Sullivan and
Rosenblatt cases could not "be stretched to the point argued by defend-
ant, even in a 'public official case' such as those two cases were, and
certainly not in a 'commercial speech' case. "22
In discussing the Magazine's foreseeability defense, the court ad-
dressed two claims: (1) it was unforeseeable that Norwood would be
physically injured as a result of the advertisements, and (2) it was not
foreseeable that lawbreakers would partake of the services advertised in
the magazine.23 Regarding the first claim, the court believed that a rea-
sonable jury could conclude that a reasonable magazine publisher should
have foreseen that someone might be hurt because the language used in
the advertisements was explicit. 24 The majority further asserted that a
reasonable person should not be surprised to hear that someone was hurt
by a hired gun advertised in its paper because guns are designed to hurt
people.25
Lastly, the court relied on Franco v. Bunyard26 to support its con-
19. Norwood, 651 F. Supp. at 1399.
20. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). In Zacchini,
the Court upheld the power of the state to allow a damage action brought by a performer
against a television broadcasting station which telecasted a videotape of the plaintiff's entire
fifteen second human-cannonball act. Id. at 578.
21. In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), Justice Stevens, writ-
ing for the majority, adhered to the principle that the difference between commercial price and
product advertising and ideological communication permits regulation of the former "that the
First Amendment would not tolerate with respect to the latter." Ido at 69 n.32.
22. Norwood, 651 F. Supp. at 1400.
23. Id. at 1402.
24. Id. at 1401-02. The court referred to such language as "gun for hire," "professional
mercenary," "all jobs considered," and "Vietnam Veteran." Id.
25. Id. at 1402.
26. 261 Ark. 144, 547 S.W.2d 91 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1978). The Norwood
court found that the consequences of defendant's conduct in Franco were as foreseeable as the
consequences flowing from the advertisements in Norwood. See Norwood, 651 F. Supp. at
1402-03.
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clusion that it is entirely foreseeable that outlaws take advantage of the
services advertised in magazines. 27 In Franco, a gun seller sold a weapon
to an escaped convict without obtaining the appropriate identification re-
quired by law. As a result, an innocent person was murdered. The court
reasoned that since the very purpose of the law was to keep firearms out
of the hands of fugitives from justice, it could not be said that use of the
gun was unforeseeable. The Norwood court adopted this reasoning and
found that the Magazine's conduct was at least as foreseeable.
At first glance, it appears that the court's lengthy discourse regard-
ing the First Amendment issue was unnecessary because it was not the
dispositive issue. However, a closer look at the case suggests that a dis-
cussion of the different treatment of commercial and non-commercial
speech was necessary in order to distinguish the issue in Sullivan from
the issue in this case to determine the appropriate rule to apply.
When the concept of "free speech" first developed, the United States
Supreme Court accorded non-commercial speech special protection. The
Court never accepted the concept of absolute free speech under the First
Amendment, even at its inception.28 In grappling with the limits of free
speech, the courts have applied a balancing test of one form or another.29
Since then, the courts have recognized another type of speech-commer-
cial speech.
Commercial speech is speech that advertises a product or service
with a "primary purpose" of profit or business.3" In applying the pri-
mary purpose test, courts in the past have looked to whether the speaker
has a "commercial interest."3 Commercial speech is a relatively recent
development and has yet to enjoy the same degree of protection as pure
speech.32
Non-commercial speech, on the other hand, at least comprises ideo-
27. Norwood, 651 F. Supp. at 1402-03.
28. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 470 (1918). In Schenck, Justice Holmes
gave us his classic illustration of unprotected speech: "The most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic." Id.
at 1400.
29. NIMMER, supra note 18 at 2-9, 2-15. There are two recognized approaches to balanc-
ing: ad hoc and definitional. Ad hoc balancing consists of determining which of two conflict-
ing interests demand the greater protection under the particular circumstances presented. Id.
at 2-9. Definitional balancing, on the other hand, consists of balancing for the purposes of
defining the nature and extent of the free speech guarantee under the First Amendment. An
example of definitional balancing is found in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964). NIMMER, supra note 18 at 2-15.
30. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942).
31. Youngs Drug Products Corp. v. Bolger, 526 F. Supp. 823, 827 n.5 (D.D.C. 1981). See
also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
32. Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, 651 F. Supp. 1397, 1399 (W.D. Ark. 1987).
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logical communication, 33 such as speech found in political, cultural or
philosophical debate. The primary distinguishing factor is its content.34
Pure speech or speech dealing directly with the governing process is ac-
corded a substantial degree of First Amendment protection because
"freedoms of speech and press have contributed greatly to the develop-
ment and well-being of our free society."' 35 It is beyond serious dispute
that Sullivan is an example of pure speech, even though it involved a
solicitation to contribute money.36
In Sullivan, the plaintiff was a political official and the advertise-
ment expressed a negative view regarding his performance in office. The
public official brought a libel suit against the newspaper that ran the al-
legedly offensive paid advertisement, claiming that the advertisement de-
famed him. However, the United States Supreme Court held that a
public officer who believes that he has been libeled regarding his public
duty must show actual malice to maintain a defamation action. With the
actual malice standard, the Court in effect defined what constitutes the
First Amendment freedom to engage in "defamatory speech" against
public officials.37 The advertisement in Sullivan involved the reporting of
events, but more importantly, it was pure speech because it "communi-
cated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested
claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement
whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest
and concern."38
With that background in mind, the Court correctly suggested that
the Magazine's reliance on Sullivan was misplaced.39 In Norwood, the
plaintiff was not a public official and the "gun for hire" advertisement
was not an attack on his political position. Although Norwood may have
found the advertisement offensive, he did not claim defamation to his
character. Indeed, Norwood's name was not even mentioned in the ad-
vertisement. Therefore, inasmuch as the Norwood court distinguished
the Magazine's situation from that of Sullivan, the court did not deviate
from the prior ruling; that is, the court correctly gave the Magazine's
33. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 69 (1976).
34. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 761 (1976).
35. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959).
36. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761; Youngs Drug Prods. Corp. v.
Bolger, 526 F. Supp. 823, 827 n.5 (D.D.C. 1981).
37. NIMMER, supra note 18 at 2-15.
38. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
39. Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, 651 F. Supp. 1397, 1401 (W.D. Ark. 1987).
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interest in publishing its advertisement no greater weight than Nor-
wood's interest based on Sullivan.
Instead, the court appropriately suggested that the Magazine's ad-
vertisement was, at most, commercial speech.' The "gun for hire" lan-
guage was simply an advertisement for employment, with no room for
public debate of any kind. The advertisements consisted of facts detail-
ing the advertisers' skills and promoted a commercial transaction. The
idea conveyed in the "gun for hire" advertisement falls squarely within
the boundaries of commercial speech. Based on this determination, the
court relied on Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. 4 ,
("Zacchini"), a commercial speech case, in making its decision. In
Zacchini, a performer brought an action against the operator of a televi-
sion broadcasting station when it telecast a videotape of the plaintiff's
entire act. The video-taping was done after the plaintiff had asked the
reporter not to do it. The Zacchini Court held that a plaintiff, believing
that he suffered damage to his property, may bring a suit against the
media to recover those damages. The Norwood court observed that
Zacchini "left little doubt that different standards are to be applied in
cases such as New York Times Co., supra, ... and cases such as Zacchini,
and, by inference, the one before this court .... 42
After properly identifying the speech involved and the applicable
standard set forth in Zacchini, the court suggested that the right to be
free from injuries resulting from "gun for hire" advertisements was
greater than the speech interest. The Norwood court, like the Sullivan
Court, did not acknowledge that the applicable rule is based upon bal-
ancing competing interests.43 However, both courts implicitly referred to
several competing policy considerations in making their decisions. The
Norwood court alluded to a duty of reasonable care when exercising free
speech and to the arbitrariness and harshness in enforcing free speech
rights without regard to the rights of others."
Underlying the Norwood court's decision appears to be a policy
against publishers misusing their authority and publishing advertise-
ments which may encroach on the safety of the public. Publishers are
charged with disseminating legitimate information to the public at
40. Id. at 1398.
41. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
42. Norwood, 651 F. Supp. at 1401.
43. Several cases following the Sullivan decision acknowledged that Sullivan was based on
balancing. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 325 (1974); Time v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448, 456 (1976).
44. Norwood, 651 F. Supp. at 1400.
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large.45 Believing that "gun for hire" advertisements are not part of that
legitimate pool of information, the Norwood court took a positive step by
discouraging such advertisements. In juxtaposing the competing inter-
ests of protecting human life and placing "gun for hire" advertisements,
it was clear that the Magazine's speech interest was marginal while the
public interest against promoting such advertisements was compelling.
Since the public interest outweighed the private interest of the Magazine,
the Norwood court was unwilling to accord First Amendment protection
to advertisements which are not vital to the democratic process.46
Moreover, the court gave little weight to the fact that the Magazine
was a third party participant and that the conduct which directly caused
Norwood's harm was the intervening criminal acts of defendants Savage
and Jackson. Courts are split on the issue of whether a defendant can be
held responsible for the intervening criminal acts of a third person.47
The dispositive factor between liability and non-liability is elusive. It ap-
pears to be impossible to state a comprehensive rule to determine when a
defendant will be liable for the intervening criminal act of a third person.
Nevertheless, in Arkansas, the state in which this case arose, courts have
held individuals liable for the foreseeable intervening criminal acts of
others.48 In accordance with this view, the Norwood court, had this case
not been settled, would have sent this case to a jury to rule on the issues
of disputed fact, particularly the issue of foreseeability. The ruling
appears to reflect sound policy with regards to "gun for hire"
advertisements.
The court's ruling may be criticized on the grounds that it will deter
individuals from publishing speech, for which society has a need, and the
right to hear, because of the fear of potential liability. Deterrence may
result even though the publisher's fear is groundless. Publishers may en-
gage in a self-imposed restriction of free speech.
Similarly, the ruling in Norwood threatens those who validly exer-
cise their rights of free expression with the expense and inconvenience of
45. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
46. See Norwood, 651 F. Supp. at 1400-01.
47. See Watson v. Kentucky & Indiana Bridge & R. R. Co., 137 Ky. 619, 126 S.W. 146
(1910) (an individual is not bound to anticipate the criminal acts of others). Contra Franco v.
Bunyard, 261 Ark. 144, 547 S.W.2d 91 (1977) (consequences of gun seller's conduct which led
to criminal acts were deemed to be foreseeable); Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334 (1976) (psychotherapist may be liable
for criminal act of patient whom he knew to be dangerous); Fernandez v. Miami Jai-Alai, Inc.,
386 So. 2d 4 (Fla. App. 1980) (Jai-Alai, Inc. is under a duty to protect its patrons from as-
sault); Hines v. Garrett, 131 Va. 125, 108 S.E. 690 (1921) (railroad company liable for rape of
a young girl who was put off in a neighborhood notorious for criminals).
48. See Franco, 261 Ark. at 145.
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criminal and civil prosecution. The fear that a magazine advertisement
may give rise to substantial liability has disturbing implications, for the
decision could lead to a dangerous degree of media self-censorship. In
the future, whenever a publisher or potential advertiser is unsure whether
a certain advertisement might lead to liability, he may decline to publish
or advertise even if the subject is clearly newsworthy and lawful. Society
is then the loser. For example, a publisher may not print a constitution-
ally protected advertisement regarding employment as a bodyguard, if
the publisher believes it may lead to a criminal act. A publisher will tend
to restrict a magazine's advertisements to those he has inspected and will
thus impose a limitation on the public's access to protected as well as
unprotected literature. Under the court's decision, all publishers would
be placed under an obligation to make themselves aware of the contents
of all advertisements placed in their magazines. It would be unreasona-
ble to demand such a high standard of discernment.
The Norwood court was positive that "gun for hire" advertisements
were not the kind of legitimate public debate the First Amendment was
meant to foster. However, the court did not carefully consider the possi-
ble ramifications of its ruling. Although the court's decision, as applied
to "gun for hire" advertisements, may be correct, its opinion is far reach-
ing and may chill the First Amendment right to free speech. There is a
disturbing possibility that the media will engage in a severe degree of self-
censorship.
Debbie Lee
1988]

